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1. INTRODUCTION
Consent is a critical concept for law. Private law often
rests upon the ability of people to create binding changes of
legal status, rights, and obligations. Contract, property,
and tort law, for instance, all create opportunities for a legal
actor to make such changes, whether through binding
promises, changes of ownership, or the waiver of claims or
defenses. The ability of a particular actor to make such
changes is often evaluated in terms of whether consent has
been given. That, in turn, depends on the capacity of the
actor to give consent. However, our prevailing legal and
social conceptions concerning capacity run in tension with
reality. On the one hand, an artificial presumption of
substantial and un-buffered adult capacity for binding
consent is useful for ease of legal administration and social
organization. On the other hand, the reality of flawed
information, inexperience, a lack of attention, and cognitive
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disabilities all too frequently put the lie to that presumption
of perfect adult capacity.
Notwithstanding the plentiful evidence of human
limitation, the law makes the most radical vision of
unfettered capacity and consent the default rule. We, the
authors, believe this vision is better viewed as a special
case. A more nuanced view of our actual capacities rests, in
part, on the understanding neuroscience provides. This
perspective suggests that we should match our rules and
jurisprudential approaches to the variable capacities that
we all show in different contexts and stages of life. Such a
view helps jurists to develop and deploy effective enhancers
and buffers around consent that reflect a more realistic
treatment of capacity. We take a hard look at the myth of
consent to add some of the tools and insights of cognitive
neuroscience and social psychology to the traditional staples
of psychology, economics, politics, and philosophy. And we
proffer innovative approaches, such as the framework of
legal assent, explored in prior work and summarized in this
article. 1
1 Professor Drobac has been exploring the myth of consent with
respect to juveniles since 2004. See Jennifer A. Drobac, Sex and the
Workplace. "Consenting" Adolescents and a Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH.
L. REV. 471, 472 n.4 (2004) [hereinafter Sex and the Workplace];
Jennifer A. Drobac, "Developing Capacity". Adolescent "Consent" at the
Workplace, at Law, and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUVENILE L. & POL'Y 1, 3 n.7 (2006) [hereinafter Developing Capacity];
Jennifer A. Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction." Science,
Teenagers and the Sting to "The Age of Consent", 20 J.L. & POL'Y 63, 65
n.9 (2011) [hereinafter "Bee Line"]; Jennifer A. Drobac, Wake Up and
Smell the Starbucks Coffee:" How Doe v. Starbucks Confirms the End of
the "Age of Consoent" in California and Perhaps Beyond, 33 B.C. J.L. &
SOC. JUST. 1, 2 (2013) [hereinafter Wake Up]. Along with this inquiry
came the understanding of the law's presumption of the "on/off' switch
of juvenile capacity and the notion of legal assent. See "Bee Line" at
113; Wake Up at 41; Jennifer A. Drobac & Leslie A. Hulvershorn, The
Neurobiology of Decision -Making in High Risk Youth & The Law of
Consoent to Sex, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 502, 522 n.57 (Summer 2014)
[hereinafter The Neurobiology of Decision -Making]; JENNIFER A.
DROBAC, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF TEENAGERS: ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT, DISCRIMINATION, AND CONSENT LAW (Univ. of Chi. Press
forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF TEENAGERS].
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We recognize that our discussion of consent will involve
some conflation of not fully equivalent doctrines and modes
of analysis. Ideas about consent are deeply intertwined
with such related topics as the keeping and enforcement of
promises, contract formation, waiver of existing rights, and
the transfer of property. These related topics are all part of
a cognitive cluster around a set of attitudes and
assumptions on human agency. The elements in this
cluster range from highly formal economics to relatively
simplistic "folk psychological" principles. 2 Their wide
acceptance supports the idea of radical consent as the
appropriate "default" approach to the law of binding action.
In our discussions, we will take the license that the
somewhat diffuse nature of our target provides. We
examine elements of this cluster without necessarily
parsing the strands of connectivity and the points of
comparison and distinction that we would make in a more
comprehensive treatment or monograph.
A. Legal Defaults can be Useful but Need to Complement
Reality
We recognize that legal defaults and presumptions have
their utility. They reflect political, philosophical, and
cultural perspectives and in some cases make the operation
of law more efficient. For example, in criminal law,
Americans assume that the accused is innocent until proven
guilty. 3 This default assumption reflects people's shared
perception that the law should give people accused of a
crime the benefit of the doubt and assume an original
Professors Drobac and Goodenough join together on this project to
examine the myth of consent in other contexts and to broaden the
application of legal assent.
2 See, e.g., Stephen Morse, Determinisn and the Death of Folk
Psychology. Two Challenge s to Responsibility from Nurovsiene, 9
MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 1 (2008). In this and other related articles,
Professor Morse explores the folk psychological models of agency and
capacity in the context of criminal law, and concludes that these models
are "safe" from the challenge of neuroscientifically informed psychology.
3 E.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
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position of innocence. This default also provides an efficient
starting point for all parties such that the prosecution must
prove criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
Criminal law also has default assumptions around the
concepts of agency and responsibility that have some
correspondence to the questions of civil capacity and
consent that we examine here. These criminal law concerns
have previously attracted significant attention from
scholars applying neuroscientific reasoning to legal
doctrine. 5 On the whole, however, we feel that the strategic
questions governing the application of third party
punishment that underlie the criminal doctrines are
different from the questions of how people bind themselves
by their declarations and actions in the civil context. This
paper focuses on civil law, and we will not undertake a
review of the criminal law discussions in this context.
Indeed, the intersection of law and neuroscience has been
limited by a predominant attention to questions of criminal
law. The symposium that gave rise to this paper and its
companions in this issue had a refreshing focus on civil
matters.
Of course, civil law also has its common defaults-and
the capacity to consent is one of them. Historically, our
society has assumed that mature adults have the capacity
to give legal consent immediately and permanently,
applicable in many contexts under the law. Consent, as we
use it, refers to the ability of an actor to irrevocably change
her position before the law with respect to some aspect of
her rights, duties, or status. Consent may be explicit or
inferred from conduct. Thus, legal consent indicates
understanding and agreement to a proposed interaction.
Consequences flow from a breach or action inconsistent with
consent. The whole system can produce results as trivial as
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain.'A Critique
of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009)
(critiquing claims concerning the neurobiology of criminal violence and
suggesting appropriate using of neuroscience in criminal law).
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the obligation to pay for a bottle of soda or as life changing
as the relinquishment of rights worth millions of dollars.
A number of reasons justify the recognition and
enforcement of such a potentially radical action. For many
people, the idea that one's word is one's bond is a matter of
deeply ingrained cultural or even religious conviction. As
such, legal consent reflects our presumption that society can
and should hold an adult accountable for her consent, her
"word." At a more theoretically grounded level of
justification, neoclassical economists assume that informed,
autonomous actors strike welfare-maximizing bargains
through free contracting. These actors exchange bargained-
for consent to arrive at efficient, productive deals, often
demonstrating "Pareto efficiency."6
The starting assumption that legal actors can bind
themselves quickly and permanently reflects a judgment
that mature adults are rational actors. Adults are capable
of gathering and processing information fully and
determining their will freely. They so engage with a clear
understanding of both short and long term consequences
and values. Milton Freedman-perhaps the archetype of
the neoclassical economist-recognized this kind of actor in
his declaration: "The possibility of coordination through
voluntary cooperation rests on the elementary-yet
frequently denied-proposition that both parties to an
economic transaction benefit from it, provided the
6 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 7
(1973); Roy Weintraub, Nooelassieal Economies, THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2007), available at
http://www. econlib.org/library/Enc 1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2015), see aso VILFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D'ECONOMIE
POLITIQUE (1909); John S. Chipman, Paroto." Manuel of Political
Economy, availablo a t http://www.econ.umn.edu
/-jchipman/DALLOZ5.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). The use of the
term "neoclassical economics" throughout this article is a useful, and
commonly adopted, shorthand to describe a particular school of thought.
Neoclassical economics frequently has more nuance than is ascribed in
our text. We note that Trebilcock makes use of this shorthand
description in his important and widely cited work on contractual limits.
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transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed"7 Jurists,
in turn, frequently assume this perfect contracting machine
as the human baseline for much of our law of consent.
Arguably, such assumptions have provided us with a
predictable and efficient basis for operation in ordering
relations between individuals, organizations, and groups,
allowing the possibility that Freedman invokes. Just as
arguably, however, these assumptions can result in
predation, unfairness, and devastating unintended
consequences. A legal tool as powerful as permanently
binding consent needs to be nuanced, reality-based, and
applied with care.
B. Goals of this Article
This Article, an introduction to the authors' broadening
research agenda, challenges the legal default of
unquestioned human capacity for consent. It posits that
legal capacity for consent is not an "on/off' switch. It
questions the notion that capacity-our rough filter for the
ability to consent-flips on at some relatively arbitrary time
that one might, as a matter of tradition, call "the age of
consent," and off again with early onset dementia or
Alzheimer's disease.
By highlighting that most negotiating parties, in a given
moment or context, may possess rather less than legally
presumed capacity to consent, this Article emphasizes the
need for legal reform. Rather than radical change, the
Article recommends systemic application of existing and
newly devised tools to establish a more nuanced approach to
our recognition of consent. A nuanced approach facilitates
interpersonal interactions with much of the same efficiency
and rather less of the potential for abuse that exists in more
radically absolute ideas of consent.
Some of these tools are already in use. For example, the
"infancy defense" in contract law, which makes contracts
voidable by "consenting" minors, has existed for hundreds of
7 MILTON FREEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962) (emphasis
added); soe also TREBILCOCK, supra note 6, at 7.
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years.8 However, jurists have not thought of these legal
devices as neurojuridical tools because neuroscientific
discoveries have only recently begun to confirm the
psychosocial evidence that contradicts common assumptions
about consent and capacity. 9 Neuroscience shows how
juveniles, elders, and many contracting adults may lack
specific capabilities while possessing others. When people
understand that brain function affects decision making,
jurists can use neuroscience to discern better how
incomplete functional capacity may influence legal capacity.
Additionally, neurojuridical tools highlight when jurists
may recognize legal consent or when they should identify a
new action, legal assent, a legal reform that requires no
presumption or existence of legal capacity.
Part II begins by setting out a few concrete examples
that demonstrate how the more radical "neoclassical
approach" to consent disserves many populations, including
not only the young and old, but all people, depending on the
contexts. For example, healthy adult actors who have less
bargaining power or information than their relational
partners encounter disadvantages in an un-buffered free
market world. This section introduces some of the
confusion one finds in the way the law currently addresses
capacity and decision-making limitations.
Part III explores some of the justifications offered for the
wide application of a radical neoclassical vision of consent.
It also offers critiques of these justifications and sets out
affirmative arguments for a more nuanced approach to
issues of consent. In a number of these arguments, we
anticipate how neurojuridical tools, based on a better
understanding of the cognitive and psychosocial capacities
that shape and limit an ability to consent, can help jurists
to create better solutions. Part III suggests that in a just
society parties maintain a framework of un-waivable duties
that they owe each other in order to prevent predation and
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2)(a) (1981).
9 E.g., Michelle Baddeley, Herding, Social Influence And Economic
Doeision -Making Soeio-P. yehologieal And Nouroseiontifk Analyses, 365
PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc. 281, 286 (2010). Se discussion infra Part IV.
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abuse. In such a society, bounded consent, or perhaps legal
assent, can better foster the structure of reliable
expectations on which social and economic interactions
depend.
Part IV explores how neuroscience and psychosocial
evidence contributes to an understanding of developing,
declining, and limited legal capacities that produce
mythical consent. In particular, this section examines a
few specific studies that explore what might be happening
in an actor's brain that arguably compromises a transaction
or taints the legal significance of the consent proffered.
Part IV demonstrates how scientific evidence can inform an
understanding of these fraught bargains. Scientific
evidence sheds light on the reality of human capacities
rather than merely asserting some imagined ideal human
actor.
Part V begins with an analysis of how traditional law
has buffered, qualified, or even disregarded, in a
fragmented manner, the radical neoclassical consent myth
and approach under certain circumstances. Examples
include coercion, undue influence, discrimination, breach of
fiduciary duty, incapacity, and other compromising factors.
Part V then explores new legal tools for dealing with the
relinquishment of rights, duties, and status. In particular,
it reviews legal assent, a mechanism that presumes no
threshold legal capacity but affords teenagers, the declining
elderly, and other adults both autonomous decision-making
authority and protection following misguided decisions.
In sum, we demonstrate that presumed capacity taints
bargains made by at-risk individuals, a class that includes
all of us depending on the context. The strategic
recognition and use of neurojuridical tools identifies at-risk
parties and circumstances and sheds light on the
problematic nature of consent offered on some occasions.
Legal reforms prompted by that enlightenment will
facilitate optimum consensual relations and ultimately
foster the Pareto enhancing goals, now mistakenly linked to
a more radical vision of consent.
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II. APPLICATION OF THE RADICAL NEOcLASSIcAL APPROACH TO
CONSENT CAN LEAD TO INJUSTICE, AMBIGUITY, AND
PREDATION
A neoclassical approach to contract generally assumes
that parties have equal bargaining power and access to
information. Through rational negotiations, these parties
arrive at a mutually beneficial Pareto optimum. The beauty
of this approach to contracting is that the parties exercise
their autonomous choices freely to maximize what they
respectively value through the bargain. The problem is that
the neoclassical model does not always reflect reality.
A. Consent by Teenagers or Sexual Exploitation?
One situation in which the freedom to consent leads to
problematic bargains involves adolescent consent to sex
with an adult, for example, a teacher or a work supervisor.
The radical neoclassical approach assumes equal
knowledge, power, and operational freedom. When the
actors consent, the neoclassical model affords both actors
binding authority. However, teenagers may not have the
experience, information, authority, or freedom that their
adult consorts enjoy. 10 The neoclassical assumptions do not
account for such variation.
Laws treat these teenagers inconsistently. Sometimes
statutes credit them with adult legal capacity to contract
and sometimes laws treat them as infants. For example,
10 For a thorough, detailed, and updated discussion of the
neurological and psychosocial development of teenagers, see SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF TEENAGERS, supra note 1. See also Jennifer A.
Drobac, Consent, Teenagers, and (Un)Civil(ized) Consequences in
CHILDREN, SEX AND THE LAW (Ellen Marrus & Sacha Coupet eds.,
forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter (Un)Civil(ized) Consequences]; Jennifer
A. Drobac, I Can't to I Kant.' The Sexual Harassment of Working
Adolescents, Competing Theories, and Ethical Dilemmas, 70 ALB. L.
REV. 675, 713-17 [hereinafter I Can't to I Kant]; see generally
Developing Capacity, supra note 1, at 1.
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until a teenager has reached the "age of consent," 11
statutory rape law may apply to erase any defensive
meaning (for the adult perpetrator) that adolescent consent
carries. 12 Thus, consent is no defense and it has no legal
influence. Even as criminal law may invalidate the legal
significance, however, civil law might credit adolescent
consent to bar the teenager from recovery for her injuries
under tort or antidiscrimination law. 13 Has the actual
capacity of the minor changed between these two contexts?
Clearly not. No matter. As between the same actors, acts,
and situation, the law gives "consent" multiple meanings.
However, none of these separate meanings accurately
captures the nuances of the minor's overall developing
11 The "age of consent" commonly refers to the age at which a minor
(someone under eighteen years old) may legally consent to engage in
sexual activity with an adult and, thereby, insulate that adult from
criminal prosecution. See Age of Consent, WIKTIONARY,
en.wiktionary.org/wiki/age of consent (last modified Apr. 28, 2015 06:49
PM) ("[Age of consent] is used to indicate the age at which it is no longer
a crime for someone else to engage in consensual sexual intercourse
with the person who is still younger than the age of consent ... "
(emphasis omitted). But see Donaldson v. Dep't of Real Estate, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 577, 588-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (noting while "age of consent"
has often been used by courts "as shorthand for the age below which...
sexual relations would support a charge for statutory rape," the phrase
may refer to the age at which a minor can legally consent to marry).
12 Soo, o.g. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(a) (West Supp. 2012)
(prohibiting unlawful sex with a minor); Ages of Consent in North
Amoriea, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ages of consent in NorthAmerica (last
modified Apr. 29, 2015, 7:38 PM); Worldwido Agos of Consont, AVERT,
http://www.avert.org/age-of-consent.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
13 For list of states in which state civil and criminal law treatment
of adolescent consent conflict, see Drobac & Hulvershorn, supra note 1,
at 525-26; soo also NPR staff, Criminal Law Says Minors Can't
Consont-But Somo Civil Courts Disagroo, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
(Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html
?action= 1&t= 1 &islist=false&id= 364538087&m=364561418
(interviewing Professor Drobac about a sexual abuse case involving a
student in the Los Angeles Unified School District and the conflicts
between California state criminal and civil laws).
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capacity. 14 Criminal law invalidates her consent; civil law
credits her consent.
1. Doe v. Starbuks, Inc.
The California matter involving Jane Doe, Timothy
Horton, and Starbucks demonstrates this multiple and
conflicting assignment of meaning. 15 In 2005, twenty-four-
year-old Timothy Horton worked as Doe's supervisor at
Starbucks. They allegedly engaged in sexual activity after
Horton made "perhaps hundreds" of profane, sexually
explicit remarks concerning his sexual interest in this
sixteen-year-old subordinate barista.16 Doe argued that she
had initially spurned his attention but that she finally
acquiesced, hoping that he would stop. 17 Doe explained:
[Horton] demanded that I perform oral sex on
him, which I did. I felt like I had to-that I
had no choice .... I felt that, because he had
given me marijuana and I had smoked it with
him, I had to do what he said, because he was
my Supervisor and I didn't want to lose my
job. is
14 In 2004, Professor Drobac first introduced the notion of
"developing capacity." Sex and the Workplace, supra note 1, at 518-19
(distinguishing the concept from "diminished capacity" because
"diminished" carries a negative connotation and suggests that capacity
should exist or may once have existed, and arguing, "[miost teenagers
suffer not from impairment but from immaturity-a blameless condition
and a natural phase of growth.")
15 See Drobac, Wake Up, supra note 1, at 29-32.
16 Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL
5183773 *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (quoting Starbucks's Objections to
Plaintiffs Evidence at 9:9-10:8, Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-
0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009)).
17 Id. at *1, *4 (citing Doe Declaration 4, Doe v. Starbucks, Inc.,
No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2009)).
18 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *3, *4 (quoting Doe Declaration
20, Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL
5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009)). Doe and Horton engaged in sexual
activities regularly through June 2006. Id. at *5. In addition to
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Horton pressured Doe to keep their relationship a secret. 19
In 2006, however, Doe told her mother and quit Starbucks
to check into a mental health treatment facility.20
California law treated Doe's consent to sex with Horton
in completely inconsistent ways. "Horton pleaded guilty to
a criminal charge of unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor under 18."' 21 In that criminal case charged under
California Penal Code section 261.5, Doe's consent was no
defense to the strict liability offense. Presumably,
California ignores the minor's consent because legislators
believe that minors do not possess the requisite capacity to
consent. 22 Doe brought a parallel civil claim against
Starbucks and Horton, however, for sexual harassment and
tort claims. 23 In the 2009 Doe v. Starucks, Inc. decision,
the California federal trial court determined that Doe's
consent to sex with her supervisor merited legal
recognition. 24 Same people, same conduct, same consent,
but criminal and civil law dictated different legal treatment.
The Starbucks court relied on dictum from a 2001
California Supreme Court incest decision, People v.
"'vaginal intercourse and oral copulation' at work and offsite, "'[they
ex-changed explicit sexual comments and text messages at work."' Id.
(quoting Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts 20, 25, Doe v.
Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG(CWx), 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2009)) [hereinafter PSMFI.
19 Id. at *5.
20 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *5, *6 (citing Doe Declaration
4, Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582AG (CWx), 2009 WL
5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) and PSMF, supra note 18, 59).
21 Id. at *6 (citing PSMF, supra note 18, 63); see Cal. Penal Code §
261.5(a) (West Supp. 2012).
22 See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consonsual Sex with Minors'
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 710 (2000);
Tara L. Pennington, Doe 1 V City Of Murrieta." How The California
Court Of Appeal Missed The Mark On Vicarious Liability For Sexual
Torts Committed By On-Duty Police Offiers, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1091,
1108 (2003).
23 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *6.
24 Id. at *7-8; see Donaldson v. Dep't. of Real Estate of State of Cal.,
36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 589 (2005).
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Tobias,25 in making its decision. Certainly, Doe argued that
Penal Code section 261.5 confirmed that she did not have
the capacity to consent. 2" The Starbucks court disagreed
quoting Tobias that "in some cases at least, a minor may be
capable of giving legal consent to sexual relations." 27
Acknowledging that Tobias was a criminal case, the
Starbucks court opined that its rule had been extended to
civil cases by Donaldson v. Department of Real Estate of
State of California.28 The Donaldson court had reasoned
that in drafting section 261.5 separate from the rape
statute, Penal Code section 261, the California Legislature
had abolished statutory rape as a crime. The Donaldson
court opined, "Just as there is no longer any 'statutory rape'
in this state, so there is no 'age of consent' as concerns
sexual relations, and references to such a concept can only
muddy the analytical waters."29 Thus, in 2005, the same
year that Horton seduced Doe, the Donaldson court
determined that there was no "age of consent" in California.
The Starbucks court simply followed established California
case law precedent.
So much for the "on" switch of legal capacity. Did Doe
have the same information and experience as her twenty-
four-year-old supervisor? Did she wield the same
bargaining power and authority? Was theirs a mutually
beneficial and efficient bargain? Can a minor of any age
consent to sex with an adult in California? Under Tobias,
Donaldson, and Starbucks, presumably so. 30 One wonders
if a proponent of the neoclassical school would have seen
25 People v. Tobias, 21 P.3d 758, 761 (Cal. 2001).
26 Starbucks, 2009 WL 5183773, at *7.
27 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tobias, 21 P.3d at 762).
28 Id.
29 Donaldson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 589.
30 Several California legislators have announced plans to sponsor
bills to correct this apparent conflict in laws. Paul Glickman, KPCC
Report on LA USD Sex Abuse Suit Sparks 3 Bills on Sexual Consent in
Civil Cases, 89.3 KPCC, Nov. 26, 2014, archived at
http://perma.cc/8FGM-AH3D; see also Teresa Watanabe, State Bill
Would Clarify that Youth Under 18 Cannot Legally Consent to Sex with
Adults, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2014, archived at http://perma.cc/RAM4-
E7BY.
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Pareto efficiency in the Starbucks result, and if so, which
one-the criminal or the civil?
2. The Radical Neoclassical Approach to "Consenting"
Teenagers
Starting from a neoclassical perspective could lead some
to argue that adolescents who consent to sex with an adult
deserve-and, indeed, have bargained for-the resulting
consequences. Positive resulting consequences might
include: emotional intimacy, satisfying sex, social prestige,
mentoring, and other employment or academic benefits.
Skeptical analysts may hypothesize that the risks of a
harmful bargain and injury for the teenager far outweigh
those for the arguably more capable adult. Negative
consequences might include: unwanted pregnancy (note
that California Penal Code section 261.5 is "the Teenage
Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1995"), the transmission of
sexual diseases, social condemnation, and psychological
distress, among other harms. Thus, the neoclassical model
may not assure an efficient or optimal bargain between an
adult and a minor. Criminal prosecution and civil liability
for personal injuries (in states that permit recovery for civil
harms), not to mention social disapproval of sexually active
youth, mediate against the efficiency and optimality of an
unbounded sexual bargain between a teenager and an
adult.
B. Capacity and Consent by Elders and Disabled Persons
Elders and disabled persons also encounter legal
problems concerning their capacity and consent.
Gerontologists understand, for example, that elders may
display reasonable decision-making skills during the day
but experience a condition known as "sundowning" as
evening approaches. At the end of the day, an elder's
capacity may decline, and the person may become
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disoriented and confused.3 1 Thus, an elder may have the
"capacity" to make certain decisions at noon, but not at 9
p.m. Legal issues for elders become even thornier after a
court adjudges a person incompetent. Similarly, disabled
persons may have inconsistent capabilities or the ability to
engage in some activities but not in others. Consider, for
example, Diane Belinky.
In 1994, Diane Belinky suffered a debilitating stroke at
the age of fifty-two. 32 Paralyzed and barely able to speak,
she entered the Drake Center, a nursing care facility. 33 Her
husband of thirty years, Barry Belinky, visited her daily
during visiting hours but then petitioned for overnight
visitation. The facility denied his request, asserting that if
he sexually molested his wife and she regained capacity, she
could sue the nursing facility. Despite the fact that Mr.
Belinky sought the opportunity to comfort his wife in the
evening, not engage in sexual relations, Drake continued to
deny his request. Noting advice from legal counsel, Drake
referred to competence, the absence of consent, and rape
case law. The appellate court reversed and held, "that a
question of fact exists as to whether Drake had reasonable
rules in effect which would have precluded Mr. Belinky
from visiting overnight." 34
A neoclassicist reviewing the Belinky case might
conclude that as long as Diane could express consent, her
husband (or anyone else who wanted to have sex with her)
was free to proceed. This perspective arguably puts
disabled and elderly persons at risk of exploitation by a
31 See generally Alzheimer's Association, Sloop lssuos and
Sundowning, ALzORG, archivod at http://perma.cc/GMLX-86UK; Donald
L. Bliwise, What is Sundowning. 42 J. AMER. GERIATRICS SOC. 1009-
1011 (Sept. 1994).
32 Sonja Barisic, Man Fighting to Spend Nights With Disablod Wife
to Comfort Her, AP NEWS ARCHIVE, Feb. 22, 1996, archivod at
http ://perma.cc/9FGB-QPAM.
33 Sonja Barisic, Judge Rejects Man ' Plea to Share Bed with His
Wifo, SOUTHCOASTTODAY.COM, Feb. 22, 1996, archivod at
http ://perma.cc/3RRP-ZGDB.
34 Belinky v. Drake Center, Inc., 690 N.E.2d 1302, 1308 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996).
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wide variety of predators, sexual and financial. This
approach also begs the question of whether a person, who
cannot speak or demonstrate consent reliably, can enter
into bargains or a contractual relationship. A negative
answer might strip some persons, who may still have
mental capacity or partial capacity, of certain rights.
One can imagine a myriad other examples of declining,
inconsistent, or impaired capacity. When jurists and other
professionals can use neuroscience and psychosocial
evidence to determine the limits of a person's decision-
making capacity, then society should afford aging persons
and the disabled as much autonomy as appropriate for the
individual. However, scientific inquiry and medical
analysis are not always precise or sophisticated enough to
allow for clear individualized classifications regarding
capacity. Moreover, the law's awkward demarcations fail to
account for the biodiversity that exists. Therefore, we
suggest adapting law to account for the fact that the "off
switch" of legal capacity is more like a dimmer or a strobe.
Fading or on and off sporadically, or both.
The two extremes of the age spectrum and the disabled
are not the only populations that would benefit from a more
nuanced legal treatment of decision-making capacity. We
all might benefit, as demonstrated in a study involving
computer "click-through" agreements (CTAs).
C. "Click-Thro ugh" Consent by Software Users
In April 2010, thousands of computer game customers
found out that they had made a Faustian bargain with the
UK-based company Game Station. As an experiment on
consumer inattention, Game Station had inserted into its
standard "click through" license form a clause that
transferred the consenting party's immortal soul to the
company. Just to further make its point, the company
offered a reward of £5 to anyone who opted out of the
transaction. Reports indicate that eighty-eight percent of
2015
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
those agreeing to the click through accepted the transfer of
the soul; only twelve percent opted for the £5 instead. 35
Research by NYU law professor Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler and others suggests that the twelve percent figure
represents a particularly vigilant population for a CTA.
Their research followed the clickstream of 47,399
households to eighty-one Internet software retailers. They
measured whether the person about to enter into an
Internet contract actually clicked on the terms and
conditions along with the time spent looking at the terms
from those who did call up the terms. They found that
even with prominent disclosure, readership, as
conservatively estimated as including all consumers that
access the EULA page for at least one second, remains less
than 0.5%."36 The probability is that the vast majority of
the persons agreeing to terms in this state of complete
ignorance are normal adults-the poster-actors for the
radical consent model of knowing consent.
Can the law really bind people in this kind of negligent
agreement? The answer, under U.S. decisions is often yes.
The seminal 1996 case ProCD v. Zeidenberg3 7 considered
whether "shrink wrap" terms, inside the box in a physical
purchase, could bind the parties. Judge Easterbrook held it
could, declaring, "Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable
unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable
to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a rule of
positive law, or if they are unconscionable)." 38
This logic has been extended in a number of cases to the
now classic CTA, provided that the formalities of contract
formation are reasonably observed. 39 Certainly, there are
35 Joe Martin, Game Station." "We Own Your Soul, "BITGAMER (Apr.
15, 2010), arc'hived at http ://perma.cc/R6JA-6U6V.
36 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Diselosuro Matter? 168 J. INST.
& THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 97 (2012), available at
http ://ssrn.com/abstract= 1713860 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 1713860.
37 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
38 Id at 1449.
39 See, e.g., Groff v. America Online, Inc., File No. C.A. No. PC 97-
0331, 1998 W L 307001 (R.I. Superior Ct., May 27, 1998) (affirming the
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efficiency arguments for the extension of contracting
through this kind of means. Seller reputation concerns and
general principles, such as unconscionability, may provide
some protection against outright predation. However, no
one can reasonably assert that the click of these "consenting
adults" exemplifies the kind of informed understanding
presumed by default under the radical model of neoclassical
consent.
D. The Class List Goes On and On
While these examples amply demonstrate the problems
that the law encounters from its traditional treatment of
consent, the list of potential targets goes on and on. There
are clearly difficulties with consent in the medical
procedure area, where even legally mandated disclosure
falls short of really meeting the goals of the "informed
consent" standard. 40 Consent given by those under
compulsion, such as prisoners, is classically suspect. 41
validity of a click-wrap agreement); Hotmail Corporation v. Van Money
Pie Inc., No. C98-20064, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal., April 16, 1998)
(holding that defendants were bound by terms of service as a result of
clicking on "I agree"). Soo also Register.com v. Verio, 356 F.3d 393 (2d
Cir. 2004) (affirming binding nature of terms of use in a repeat
transaction context). But soo Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding a subsequent email of additional terms does not
bind the recipient); Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (click
through agreement to arbitration not binding if the terms not
conspicuous) and Dunstan v. comScore, Inc., No. 11-cv-05807, 2013 WL
6909514 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2013) (click through not enforceable when the
contracting information was "obscured"). Soo gonorally Nathan J.
Davis, Prosumod Assont. Tho Judicial Aeeoptaneo of Clickwrap, 22
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 577 (2007).
40 E.g., Paula Walter, Tho Doetrino of Informod Consont." To Inform
or Not To Inform971 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 543 (1997); Jaime S. King &
Benjamin Moulton, Rothinking Informod Consont" Tho Caso for Sharod
Modieal Doeision -Making, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 429 (2006). Soo genorally
Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1992).
41 Soo, o.g., 45 CFR § 46.305 (additional duties of the Institutional
Review Boards where prisoners are involved). Soo Keramet Reiter,
Exporimontation on Prisonors:' Porsistont Dilommas in Rights and
Rogulations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 501 (2009); Daniel R. Mendelsohn, Tho
2015
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
Consumer credit agreements are notoriously one-sided, a
condition that prompted creation of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. 42 As will be discussed more fully below
in the context of existing legal buffers and enhancers, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recognized the
frequent use of certain predatory tactics in other consumer
transactions as well. 43 Employers constantly use their
greater experience to put waivers, covenants, and transfers
of rights into their contracts with prospective employees.
Most of these job seekers (and especially those who are
desperate in a slow economy) just sign on the dotted line
with little concept of what they are giving away. 44 Even in
Right to Refuse." Should Prison Inmates Be Allowed to Discontinue
Treatment for Incurable, Noncommunicable Medical Conditions, 71
MD. L. REV. 295 (2011). But see, Sharona Hoffman, Bonoficial and
Unusual Punishment." An Argument in Support of Prisoner
Participation in Clinical Trials, 33 IND. L. REV. 475 (2000); David J.
Moser et al., Coercion and Informed Consent in Research Involving
Prisoners, 45 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 1 (2004).
42 Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-
bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015). See About Us,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2015)
(describing the mission of the CFPB in the following terms: "Above all,
this means ensuring that consumers get the information they need to
make the financial decisions they believe are best for themselves and
their families-that prices are clear up front, that risks are visible, and
that nothing is buried in fine print. In a market that works, consumers
should be able to make direct comparisons among products and no
provider should be able to use unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.").
43 See infra notes 145-154 and accompanying text.
44 Soo, e.g., Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, No.
S204302 (Cal. June 23, 2014), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/
opinions/documents/S204032A.PDF (upholding the waiver of class
action rights); Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Compotes Unenforceable, 54
Az. L. REV. 939 (2012) (criticizing enforceability of employee agreements
not to compete); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 24
Cal. 4th 83 (2000) (upholding an employment contract that mandated
arbitration and invalidated court action for resolution of employment
related disputes). See generally Craig R. Senn, Knowing and Voluntary
Waivers of Federal Employment Claims' Replacing the Totality of
Circumstances Test with a "Waiver Certainty" Test, 58 FLA. L. REV. 305
(2005).
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the relatively rarified world of securities and investment
decisions by knowledgeable, wealthy individuals, the
standard agreements require investors to consent to dispute
resolution procedures which can eviscerate many legally
mandated protections. "Virtually all brokerage firms
include provisions in their standard-form customer
agreements requiring arbitration of customers' disputes in
the FINRA [Financial Industry Regulatory Authority]
forum." 45 Investors routinely agree to these provisions,
often with little understanding of the consequences. 46
III. JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITIQUES OF THE RADICAL
NEOCLASSICAL VISION OF CONSENT
Given the mismatch of theory and reality that these
examples demonstrate, why do we accept the radical notions
of capacity and consent as the starting point in so much of
private law? The justifications for such an unrestricted idea
of consent fall into several categories briefly summarized
here. As noted above, ideas about consent are deeply
intertwined with the enforcement of promises, contract
formation, and other statements and actions that create
legal obligations. These notions about legal obligations are
not always identical in definition or function to any
particular formulation of capacity and consent.
Nevertheless, we believe that these notions, whether or not
rooted in fact, are part of a cognitive cluster. This cluster
underlies the acceptance of the radical idea of consent as
the appropriate "default" approach in private ordering.
In our review of these justifications, we also note and
offer critiques. Many of these criticisms have been explored
extensively in other contexts, under labels such as "market
failure." We do not claim originality in setting them out,
but we do believe that it is time to offer them again. More
45 Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the
FederalArbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. OF COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 4 (2012).
46 Id.; S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbitration.'
Wa6"ve of the Future? 29 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 690
(2014).
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importantly, we combine them with the cognitive and
neuroscientific evidence of the kind set out in Section IV.
This combination supports our core argument that
American law would benefit from a more nuanced concept of
consent.
A. Morality and Philosophy
First, theorists offer moral and philosophical
justifications to support unrestricted consent. In this
regard, consent often translates, in the context of a bargain,
to serve as a promise. The concept that "my word is my
bond" has deep resonance in everyday morality, and not just
in the United States and other European traditions. 47 It
has application across all segments of society. Its Latin
version, "dictum meum pactum," has served as the motto of
the London Stock Exchange. 48 The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy recognizes, "Few moral judgments are more
intuitively obvious and more widely shared than that
promises ought to be kept." 49 The faithfulness to a
mistakenly given, or even predatorily extracted oath, even
in the face of a disastrous cost, often has a heroic status in
literature, and is rooted deeply in Western cultural history,
as evidenced by The Saga of the Jomsvikings. 50 The
religious faithful, including the Promise Keepers, 51 have
built huge movements that view promises as devotions to
47 MARTIN HOGG, PROMISES AND CONTRACT LAW: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (2011).
48 Our History, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE,
http ://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-exchange/company-
overview/our-history/our-history.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
49 Allen Habib, Promises, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Mar. 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EPV7-2UPV (provides a
useful expansion on the necessarily terse summary provided here); see
also, HOGG, supra note 47.
50 Lee M. Hollander, The Saga of the Jomsvikings, (Sigubur Nordal
& G. Turville-Petre eds., N. F. Blake trans., 1962), arehived at
http ://perma.cc/T3VA-KH7C.
51 What, PROMISE KEEPERS, http://www.promisekeepers.org; see
also Gustav Niebuhr, Men Crowd Stadiums to Fulfill Their Souls, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, archived at http://perma.cc/VJ22-WEND.
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God, if not as sacraments. This simple moral principle that
a promise should be kept is a source of the legal idea of
binding consent. 52
More developed ethical theory also honors the principle
that promises are binding.53 Legal scholars have credited
the pro-promise keeping elements of Aristotle and Aquinas
with providing the intellectual framework for the synthesis
of contract law over the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 54 The emphasis on a binding exercise of "will" in
that philosophical tradition, in particular, may provide the
basis for contemporary considerations of autonomy and
capacity as key elements in the creation of binding
consent. 55 Contemporary philosophy also seeks
justifications for the importance of making and fulfilling
bargains. 56 In turn, legal scholars have appropriated those
justifications.
It should be noted that philosophers have also critiqued
promise keeping. Hume, for example, reacted sarcastically
to religiously based arguments on promise keeping and
declared:
I shall farther observe, that since every new
promise imposes a new obligation of morality
on the person who promises, and since this
new obligation arises from his will; it is one of
the most mysterious and incomprehensible
operations that can possibly be imagined, and
may even be compared to
TRANSUBSTANTIATION, or HOLY
52 Soo, o.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE
LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS (1998); HOGG, supra note 47.
53 Soo, o.g., Habib, supra note 49; JAMES GORDLEY, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (199 1).
54 GORDLEY, supra note 53 at 3-29.
55 Id. at 7-9.
56 John Rawls, Two Conceopts of Rulos, 64 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REV.
3 (1955); Michael G. Pratt, Promisos and Porlocutions CRISPP:
CRITICAL REV. OF INT'L SOC. AND POL. PHIL., Jun. 2002, at 93-119; T.M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998); DAVID P. GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
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ORDERS, ... where a certain form of words,
along with a certain intention, changes entirely
the nature of an external object, and even of a
human nature. 57
The Consequentialist/Utilitarian tradition in philosophy
moves away from the inherent worthiness of bargain
keeping to a view of its functionality. Enforceable promises
provide a framework within which parties can structure
arrangements that have good results. Such a utilitarian
approach bleeds over into exactly the kind of functionalism
that informs economic analysis and the justification of
contracts.
B. Economic Justifications
As introduced above, the principle of a bargained-for
exchange between informed, rational, willing actors is
central to neoclassical economics. 58 Economists have
thoroughly explored this topic and we offer only a rough
summary of the economic justifications for enforcing
promises.
Some of the arguments in favor of enforcement and
support are non-utilitarian. For instance, some theorists
assert that the fulfillment and enforcement of voluntary
private bargains support personal liberty and autonomy as
a general principle. 59 Other validations are directly
utilitarian. Binding consent supports exchanges that
produce Pareto superiority, where at least one of the parties
benefits and neither is worse off. This result demonstrates
utility enhancement clear and simple.60 As Trebilcock put
it:
57 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE pt. 2, § 5 (1738)
(emphasis in the original), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm#link2H 4 0022.
58 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7.
59 E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE
PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011).
60 E.g., Jules Coleman, Effieney Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95 (1988); see, 0.9.,
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[I]f two parties are to be observed entering into
a voluntary private exchange, the presumption
must be that both feel the exchange is likely to
make them better off, otherwise they would not
have entered into it. Thus, in most exchanges,
the economic presumption is that they make
all the parties thereto better off, that is, they
are Pareto superior. 1
We note that not all examples of consent as we have
broadly defined it here fit fully with the idea of an
"exchange." Nonetheless, we believe that the enthusiasm of
neoclassical economics for private exchange rooted in this
kind of logic is a powerful element in the radical view of
consent.
We also note that Pareto positive transactions might
possibly occur without necessarily invoking the ideas of
capacity, consent, and obligation that we are examining
here. Simultaneous exchange, for instance, does not need
any kind of contract with a temporal duration. However,
even in the case of simultaneous exchange, the element of
voluntariness that maps onto consent is still present as a
criterion. Any non-simultaneous exchange needs some kind
of guaranty of temporally sequential action to overcome the
possibility of first-mover exposure to second-mover
defection. Such a guaranty can be variously instantiated in
psychology, a physical contraption such as the dual key lock
box or classic soda machine, 62 or cultural expectations.
Additionally, the availability of enforceable, self-binding
rights-creation for others in contract, tort, and property is a
powerful tool that opens up space for transactions.63
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 283 (6th ed.
2012); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
293 (2004).
61 TREBILCOCK, supra note 6, at 7.
62 E.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Values, Mechanism Design, and
Fairnoss. in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE
ECONOMY 228 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
63 Id.
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We believe, however, that when the rules for recognizing
enforceable bargains incorporate not only the power of
legally binding consent, but also the criteria on which that
power rests, even greater space for transactions develops.
When the rules are modified to require buffered and
mitigated consent in light of the human cognitive and
informational constraints that underlie transactional
reality, vast expanses for creative interaction emerge.
The recognized criteria for making utilitarian, Pareto
enhancing exchanges-the likely outcome of private
bargaining-are not trivial. While variously stated and
enumerated, the criteria may involve: (1) parties with
stable, well ordered preferences; (2) choices that are fully
voluntary and unconstrained; (3) relatively equal, and
ideally complete, information; (4) relatively equal
bargaining power and experience; (5) sufficient cognitive
capacity to evaluate the transaction and to exercise
voluntary control over the conflicting factors and emotions
involved; (6) the absence of monopoly power or other
distortions of the market; (7) the presence of good faith and
absence of fraud in both parties; and (8) a level of
consequence for a mistake that is not disastrous to the
party.6 4 Given the many factors that must come together to
create the "perfect Friedman," if we may call it such, it
seems bizarre that philosophers, scholars, and jurists would
celebrate unfettered consent as the default state.
One can easily predict the failure to meet all criteria.
The likely effect of such failure is that the party with
greater knowledge, experience, or power will create
exploitative traps for the other party. The bargain becomes
partly or fully predatory, and the Pareto goal is purposefully
not achieved, at least by one party. Trebilcock summarized
this potential when he wrote, "This presumption [that
exchange will result in a Pareto superior outcome] is
rebuttable by reference to a fairly conventional list of forms
64 This list, while not complete, is a composite of factors drawn from
a number of sources. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 341 (6th ed. 2012); TREBILCOCK, supra note 6, passim;
SHAVELL, supra note 60, ch. 13-14.
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of market failure or, in a transaction specific context,
contracting failure, which neo-classical economists
recognize as inconsistent with this presumption, for
example, monopoly, externalities, information failures."65
The failure to account for these disabling characteristics
reflects a deliberate ignorance of reality for many kinds of
markets and transaction realities.
On the other hand, we believe that there are also many
sorts of markets and kinds of transactions where the parties
possess a sufficient allocation of "Friedman" faculties.
When parties possess such faculties, enforcement of the
results of unconstrained bargains is sensible, and can be
expected, on the whole, to lead to Pareto enhancing results.
Many consumer retail transactions fall into this category.
Most people will indeed make good decisions on deciding
what kind of toothbrush or laundry detergent to buy. Even
in these transactions, however, the distorting power of
advertising gives the manufacturer some advantage in
shaping the preferences of the consumer. 66 High dollar
value deals between well-informed insiders in structured
markets are likely to meet most of the criteria and to give
the intended kind of results. Examples of this range from
the deals between film producers and the key service
providers in a production, when all are experienced
professionals, to transactions for commodities between a
regular producer and an established company adding it to a
product.
In cases such as these, an un-recallable, fully reliable
transfer or release is a critical ingredient in the ability to
carry on the business-at-hand expeditiously. In these cases,
the most radical version of unfettered consent has a place in
a vibrant economy. But even here, the transactions are
often, at least partly, structured in advance, through legal
defaults, market rules, union minimums, industry
expectations, standard forms, etc. Even expert deals are
generally not created on a "tabula rasa." Furthermore, the
65 TREBILCOCK, supra note 6, at 7.
66 I Can't to I Kant, supra note 10, at 729-30 (writing about the
possible effects of "aspirational advertising" on youth).
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potential for abuse exists here as well, as the sad tale of
transactions such as the Bankers Trust's "LIBOR squared"
contract of the 1990s demonstrates.6 7
Of course, the real world is often far more "shadowy and
lumpy" than the well-illuminated, un-tilted playing field of
voluntary interchange imagined by Friedman and others
and embodied in the simple or expert transactions outlined
above. Even most neoclassical economists will concede this
point, depending on how strongly one characterizes the
term "often."
While the extreme view of unfettered autonomy to bind
by consent may have a place in certain formal market
contexts, cognitive limits and informational and power
imbalances make a wide, unexamined application of this
system inappropriate. New neuroscientific discoveries and
behavioral studies change how we perceive "rational" actors.
Information relating to developing capacity, declining
mental function, sundowning, situational stress, and other
factors suggests that even "rational" actors may have
trouble accessing knowledge, controlling impulses, and
making the synaptic connections that result in optimal
bargained-for outcomes. 68 In part, imperfect actors and
conditions corrupt consent.
Welcome to the real world and the behavioral, neuro-
and heterodox economics that seek to describe what really
happens. 69 Relational contract theorists and others
67 See David M. Rowe, Risk Management Beyond VaR, 48 EDPACS:
EDP AUDIT, CONTROL, & SECURITY NEWSL., no. 1, 2013, at 1-27. One
client, Gibson Greetings, sued Bankers Trust after its plain-vanilla
swap agreements were replaced with a LIBOR-squared variant. For a
discussion of the Gibson Greetings case, see James Overdahl & Barry
Schachter, Derivatives Regulation and Financial Management" Lessons
from Gibson Greetings, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1995, at 24, 68-78. For legal
background on the case, see David M. Lynn, Enforceability of Over-the-
Counter Financial Derivatives, 50 BUS. LAW., no. 1, Nov. 1994, at 291-
337. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, DEATH OF CORPORATE
REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET
(2013).
68 See, e.g., "Bee Line," supra note 1, at 66-78.
69 See, e.g., BEYOND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: HETERODOX
APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC THEORY (Fred E. Foldvary ed., 1996).
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recognize that imperfect conditions, compromised actors,
deceptive or manipulative practices, incomplete
information, and myriad other factors lead to inefficient
results or bad deals by human (and, therefore, imperfect)
actors. 70
Looking at the challenges, we conclude that the
circumstances where Pareto outshines predation are better
regarded as a special case and not the general case for
establishing the power of consent under the law. There is
simply too much potential in too many circumstances for a
failure of the criteria of a utility enhancing bargain to
justify radical consent as the default choice. It is worth
recalling that Pareto is any "rational" player's second best
outcome, less desirable than one where the transaction
deducts value from the other side and adds it to the
"rational" player's account. If the given player can arrange
the transaction in such a predatory manner without other
negative consequences (such as those that might accrue
from social stigma, the law or repeat play concerns), there is
all too great a temptation to go for option one to do just that.
In such a predatory case, obviously, the Pareto enhancing
utility goals of adopting unfettered consent as a default
principle will not be met. In fact, just the opposite is likely
to be the result.
To deal with this, the law has carved out a significant
number of "exceptions" to the general presumptions of
radical consent. These exceptions buffer, constrain, or
supplement the process of consent and the attainment of a
binding promise. Rather than viewing these legal and
regulatory interventions as a drag on Pareto optimizing
processes-as neoclassical economists are wont to do-in
many cases we should regard them positively. They become
Pareto-enhancing cognitive prostheses, rebalancing the
70 See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory. Challenges
and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 877 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, Values in
Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 340 (1983); Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment Of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical Neoclassical And Relational Con tract Law, 72 NW. U.
L. REv. 854 (1977).
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inequalities of power and information, or otherwise shoring
up the failing assumptions on which a Pareto transaction
needs to rest. 71 We argue, therefore, that these "exceptions"
should constitute the actual general case. Viewed correctly,
we believe, the welfare-enhancing goals of neoclassical
economics will be best served by a view of consent based in
the reality of human cognitive capacity rather than in a
myth of omnipotent rationality and capacity. An acceptance
that Pareto-prostheses have a positive role to play in many
instances prompts a balanced inquiry into how the law
should treat consent. 72
C Combining Economic and Philosophical Justifications.'A
Ra wlsian Exploration
Another tradition combines economic and philosophical
justifications in a contractarian context: the approach to
justice espoused by John Rawls. 73 His method involves
imagining the rules that would be freely agreed to in
advance by parties in the fictional "original position." A key
element in Rawls's analysis is to suppose that human actors
will be differently placed in reality with respect to wealth,
power, education, information, and cognitive capacity. 74
Note how this sounds like both the world we in fact live in
and the world that creates problems for the abstracted,
neoclassical welfare enhancing transaction. In order to set
rules for such a reality that will be fair and just, the players
are placed behind a "veil of ignorance," where they know
what the inequities will look like, but are ignorant of where
they will fall as individuals in that spread of inequality.
Sitting in such an original position, the future players are
71 It is possible to regard the rules of property, which are generally
recognized by even the most libertarian neoclassicist, as such an
intervention. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 59.
72 PETER J. RICHERSON & ROBERT BOYD, NOT BY GENES ALONE: HOW
CULTURE TRANSFORMED HUMAN EVOLUTION 240 (2005).
73 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
74 Id. at 118 et seq.; see also, NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS,
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: BASIC TOOLS FOR
NORMATIVE REASONING 26 (2005).
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asked to rationally decide on the rules they want to govern
the play once they find themselves in the game. The future
players must also choose rules that they themselves cannot
waive in the play itself-a step that would defeat the whole
exercise.
The story of Odysseus and the Sirens is a useful (if
mythical) example of such a binding pre-commitment. The
Sirens were creatures with magically captivating voices
that used their singing to lure sailors toward them and onto
hidden rocks that would sink their ships and drown them
all. The course which Odysseus and his band needed to sail
would take them within the Sirens' range. Following the
advice of Circe, Odysseus had his crew put wax in their ears
to make them deaf to the singing. Wishing to hear the
beautiful music himself, Odysseus did not use the wax, but
had himself tied securely to the mast of the ship. He
extracted a promise from all his crewmembers not to untie
him, no matter how hard he begged or pleaded. In
something like the original position, he was creating a rule
to protect himself from the mistakes of his will in the heat
of the moment. And of course, once the song was in his
ears, Odysseus begged his crew to set him free-which
would have led to their destruction. His crew tied him only
tighter. He was protected from himself and they from
him. 75
The Rawlsian approach is, of course, a thought
experiment rather than a real undertaking. However, we
believe that the construction of the kind of buffered legal
pathways to Pareto style transactions that we propose here
are not only appealing, but also useful. When players do
not know whether they will be expert credit card proprietors
or non-expert consumers who exist a step away from
subsistence, the rules they agree to on credit penalties and
bankruptcy will probably involve contract and consent
limits embedded in law. They will probably not elect to
have rules designed for certain transactions that bind in
every circumstance. And when players do not know
75 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, Book 12, (Samuel Butler trans.) (c. 800
B.C.E.), availablo at http://classics.mit.edu/Homer/odyssey. 12.xii.html.
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whether they will be inexperienced and vulnerable
adolescent women, their predatory bosses, or the owners of
companies that should safeguard workplaces for young
workers, those players will make different elections than if
they knew in advance. The law of "consent" that limits the
right of such young workers to seek damages from the
company might look considerably different from that
applied in cases like Doe v. Starbucks.
While we have so far examined justifications for consent
that focus on particular transactions, the law also needs to
take into account other goals in fashioning its approach.
Complications to such a rule-making exercise arise from the
need to let the young learn from experience, the old to keep
making the decisions that are within their fraying
capacities, and the rest of us to achieve a significant level of
self-determination and autonomy in our lives. The "nanny
state" has a bad reputation for a reason, and not every
opportunity for a binding commitment has a Siren song
consequence. The "nanny state" is arguably the polar
opposite of the "Friedman" state, and just as flawed. So
how to strike the balance?
We have work to do. A system that allows the rich to
extract from the poor in one-sided credit transactions and
the experienced to predate on youth just learning to manage
their sexuality fails from almost any perspective, utilitarian
or moral. We need to do better. We must dismiss the myth
of radical consent as the starting point for the enforcement
of rules about commitment. Techniques already present in
the law and ones that we can propose as new approaches
help us to fortify a system of compensation for the "market
failures" that otherwise threaten to defeat Pareto.
D. The Challenge of'Autonomy"
Another source of confusion stems from the idea that
radical ideas of capacity and consent are necessary
correlates of principles of human autonomy. This
presumption sets up a kind of logical trap, in which
autonomy is an "all or nothing" property. In such a view, if
one wants, for example, adolescents or young adults to have
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control of some aspects of their sexuality (e.g. use of birth
control or choices over an abortion), one must conclude that
they, therefore, have full and binding consensual authority
over all aspects of sexuality (e.g. consent to sexual relations
with a coercive and deceitful supervisor). Such a
perspective is needlessly simple-minded. Analyzing with
greater nuance, one understands that "autonomy" (i.e. the
ability to make one's own choices about life) is always
contextual. There is no necessary connection between the
legal validation of a young person's decisions about some
aspects of sexuality and her legal protection in other
contexts.
This contextual approach is particularly important as
society seeks to create "learning spaces" within which youth
can exercise sexual decision making with a reduced threat
of predation. Society's establishment of "learner's permits"
and "junior licenses" for driving recognizes that adolescents
do not have an on/off switch for competence behind the
wheel. Why expect it in other aspects of life?
Similarly, one can recognize the capacity of the elderly to
make certain binding decisions in the moment, and still
protect or buffer the decision making of seniors in other
contexts. Factors such as the import of a matter, time of
day, access to advisors, opportunities to change the mind,
and physical and mental health can make all the difference
in the quality and integrity of a decision. All of us face
circumstances in which we need a bit of help or protection
in making important decisions. None of that is inconsistent
with any but the most simple-minded and absolutist view of
autonomy.
This understanding of human limitations is not just a
common sense observation. Cognitive neuroscience is
linking up with traditional psychology to provide us with
detailed knowledge of decision-making processes in a wide
variety of populations that allows jurists and others to take
a more nuanced approach.
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IV. THE NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHOSOCIAL STUDIES OF
DECISION MAKING BY DIVERSE POPULATIONS AND IN A
VARIETY OF CONTEXTS
A wide variety of influences can affect decision making.
Science now confirms the effects of certain factors such as
age, financial indebtedness, medical condition, and stress.
For example, many jurists who advocate for children have
used the neurobiological and psychosocial evidence of
adolescent development to show how teen decision making
is different from that of adults. 76 Scientists have explored
decision making in other situations to show how context
affects how people actually make choices, sometimes in
ways congruent with the so-called rational actor model and
in others divergent. An examination of some of these
situations and the related scientific studies sheds light on
how people experience altered mental processes and how
those processes may influence their decisions.
A. Neuroscience of Decision Making
Neuroscience is that branch of biology that investigates
the physical processes of thought and behavior. Its
fundamental premise is the belief that an understanding of
these physical attributes of structure, electrical activity,
and chemical interaction will contribute to an
understanding of the cognitive outcomes they help to
produce. 77 At its best, neuroscience engages in a
conversation with the more traditional approaches of
psychology, economics, and other social sciences to help
confirm some existing knowledge, contradict other elements
of received wisdom, and generally illuminate the kind of
inquiry we are engaged in here. Indeed, the field of
neuroeconomics has come into being precisely to integrate
these findings into the insights from other branches of
76 See, e.g., The Nourobiology of Decision -Making, supra note 1, at
502.
77 E.g., Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive
Nouroscionceo, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. Sci. 61 (2010).
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economic studies-including those of the neoclassical school.
As Cambridge neuro-psychologist Michelle Baddeley
expressed it: "[n]euroscientific evidence can help us to
understanding the roles played by socio-psychological
factors in economic decision-making and-developing ideas
from psychology, evolutionary biology and neuroscience-
neuroeconomists argue that understanding brain
organisation and function can help us to understand
economic and financial behaviour." 78
It is not within the scope of this article to summarize or
critique the tools and methods of neuroscience. Some
aspects are broadly accepted as settled science; others are
open to greater concern. Taken together, however,
neuroscientific findings provide significant evidence for a
more nuanced model of cognitive capacity than that
produced by the simple assumptions of neoclassical
economics. As Baddeley summarized in the abstract to one
of her works:
Typically, modern economics has steered away
from the analysis of sociological and
psychological factors and has focused on
narrow behavioural assumptions in which
expectations are formed on the basis of
mathematical algorithms. Blending together
ideas from the social and behavioural sciences,
this paper argues that the behavioural
approach adopted in most economic analysis,
in its neglect of sociological and psychological
forces and its simplistically dichotomous
categorization of behaviour as either rational
or not rational, is too narrow and stark .... In
understanding the mechanisms affecting
economic and financial decision-making, an
interdisciplinary approach is needed which
incorporates ideas from a range of disciplines
78 Baddeley, supra note 9, at 286.
2015
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
including sociology, economic psychology,
evolutionary biology and neuroeconomics. 79
Other neuroscientific reviews of decision making suggest
a similar need for nuance of the kind we argue for here.80
Factors cited as increasing or diminishing the capacity to
make "correct" decisions of the kind anticipated from a
"rational" economic actor include the presence of stress,8 1
emotional arousal, 8 2 and help, training, and experience.8 3
Experience is not just a matter of abstracted knowledge.
One widely considered model for certain kinds of decision
making suggests that the brain undertakes "neural value
computations" 84 comparing the outcomes of taking or
refraining from a particular action. The formation of the
value assessments which underlie such a comparison,
however, have been modeled and observed as iterative
processes, built from repeated experience with taking the
choice in question.8 5 Such findings support our conclusion
that the model of radical consent does disservice to those
without experience, such as adolescents in matters of
sexuality and most of us in the face of rare and unfamiliar
transactions, such as the purchase of automobiles or houses.
Disclosure, while useful, is not necessarily an antidote to
79 Id. at 281.
80 See, e.g., Nasir Naqvi et al., The Role of Emotion in Decision
Making A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 260 (2006); Michael L. Platt & Scott A. Huettel, Risky
Business." The Ne uroeconomics of Decision Making Under Uncertainty
11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 398 (2008); Daeyeol Lee, Decision Making'
From Neuroscience to Psychiatry 78 NEURON 233 (2013); Christian C.
Ruff & Ernst Fehr, The Neurobiology of Rewards and Values in Social
Decision Making, 15 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 549 (2014).
81 E.g., Katrin Starcke & Matthias Brand, Decision Making Under
Stress. A Selective Review 36 NEUROSCIENCE AND BIOBEHAVIORAL
REVIEWS 1228 (2012).
82 E.g., Nasir Naqvi et al., supra note 80.
83 E.g., Johannes Schiebener et. al., Supporting Decisions Under
Risk. Explicit Advice Differentially Affects People According to Their
Working Memory Performance and Executive Functioning,
NEUROSCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING 9 (2013).
84 Ruff & Fehr, supra note 80, at 549.
85 E.g., id.; Lee, supra note 80.
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the knowledge that brains seemingly need to acquire
through trial and error. As we have argued, law needs to
create relatively safe opportunities in which to gain such
experience-the "learner's permit" approach has
neurological validity.
The remainder of Part IV takes a closer look at the
results from neuroscientific and psychosocial studies in four
specific contexts of decision making: anger, organ donation
during times of grieving, stress and the elderly, and
consumer acceptance of CTAs. While explicitly anecdotal,
together they provide a useful sampling of the scientific
inquiries that are forcing a reconsideration of the simplified
psychology of neoclassical economics.
B. Anger and Decision Making
Criminal law has perhaps always recognized the role of
emotions in decision making. The "heat of passion" is a
legal phrase that describes the enraged mental state of one
accused of a crime. In some criminal cases, emotional rage
constitutes a defense to disprove a required mental state,
mens rea, such as premeditation. It can, thereby, effectively
reduce a charge from, for example, homicide to
manslaughter. For the defense to be applicable, however,
the perpetrator's act, the actus reus, must have occurred
immediately after the rage prompting event. So, for
hundreds of years at least, the law has recognized the
influence of anger on "rational" decision making (or the lack
thereof).
Recent psychosocial studies explore the influence of
emotion on decision-making behavior. One study explored
anger and decision making regarding tortfeasors. 86
86 Jennifer Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of
Accountability Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of
Reosponsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 563-74 (1998),
available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/tetlock/vita/philip / 20tetlock/phil / 20tet
lock/ 1994-1998/1998%20Sober%20Second%20Thought.... pdf (last visited
April 5, 2015).
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Subjects in a lab viewed an anger-inducing video and then
made decisions on unrelated fictional tort claims involving
negligence and injury. Subjects who viewed the anger-
inducing video, as predicted, made more punitive
attributions about responsibility than did those subjects
who viewed a neutral emotion prime. 87
Researchers found that these results changed when
subjects knew that they would be held accountable and
were asked to explain their decisions to experts whose views
they did not know. When subjects knew they would be held
accountable for their decisions in the tort cases, they were
better at managing the effects of anger on their decisions.
They still felt the anger but subjects judged the tortfeasors
less harshly. Interestingly, subjects who viewed the neutral
prime also made less punitive attributions when they knew
they would have to explain their decisions to an expert.88
The results of this study prompted the researchers to
conclude, "The punitive carryover might represent a form of
misattribution; people apparently do not recognize the true
determinants of their judgments."8 9 The scientists added,
"[p]erhaps the most important implication for affect
judgment research is that social/structural relationships
moderate the otherwise recursive relationship between
blame cognitions and anger."90
If the knowledge of individual accountability can temper
the effect of an anger response on judgments then law
arguably has a role to play in the mediation of emotions on
decision making generally.
C Decision Making About Organ Donation By Grieving
Relatives
Like anger, grief is another emotion that people
recognize has an effect on decision making. Rational
decision makers might disagree about the decision to donate
87 Id. at 568, 570.
88 Id. at 568.
89 Id. at 570.
90 Id. at 572.
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a deceased loved one's organs. Religious views, interest in
the advancement of science, and other factors influence the
decision. However, stress and grief also play a role in this
decision-making process.
In one study, researchers noted that some family
members might opt for organ donation to relieve their pain
and suffering. Others sought to "buy time" with sustained
life support. These individuals retained the hope for their
loved one's recovery or wanted more time to adjust to the
death and to say goodbye. Those who declined donation
might have done so to protest the injustice of their loss.
Some declined donation in protest or as a refusal to accept
the loss of their beloved. 91
Several factors contributed to affirmative decisions to
donate. First, the will of the decedent to donate, sometimes
expressed in legal declarations, made the decision easier for
grieving loved ones. 92 The decedent's desire did not always
control, however. When family members reached
consensus, donation was more likely to occur. When family
members disagreed, the members who opposed donation
tended to prevail. One study's researchers explained:
Reasons for nondonation included fear about
the reaction of the family . . .and the wish to
avoid conflict. . . . Some family members
regarded responsibility for the decision to
donate as theirs alone .. . , whereas others
declined donation as they were reluctant to
assume total responsibility .... Compounding
family stressors such as multiple losses or
communication conflicts also contributed to
situations of nondonation .... 93
91 Wendy Walker et al., Factors Influencing Bereaved Families'
Decisions About Organ Donation. An Integrative Literature Review, 35
WEST. J. NURS. RES. 1339, 1348-49 (2013).
92 Id. at 1346.
93 Id. at 1349.
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These factors indicate that cooperation and consensus in
favor of donation during this stressful period contribute to
affirmative donation decisions. This study also suggests
that fear and attitudes regarding roles influence choice.
One should be cautious in extrapolating from a study
focused on organ donation to understand stress in other
situations, often not involving issues of life and death so
directly. On the other hand, this study is consistent with
findings in broader contexts that stress, grief, conflict, fear,
and other similar factors influence human decision makers
in ways that put the validity of immediate consent into
question. The Federal Trade Commission's decision to
target funeral industry practices for particular scrutiny and
attention under its Funeral Industry Practices Revised Rule
confirms that decision making in the context of grief over
loss of a loved one deserves special treatment. 94
D. Effects of Stress on Financial Decision Making in Aging
Persons
A 2013 report confirms that high financial debt leads to
stress, depression, and other negative general health
indicators. 95 The related question that arises is whether
stress might reciprocally affect financial decision making. A
study published in 2014 examined the influence of stress on
financial decision making in persons aged fifty and older.
Investigators hypothesized that even the stressor of an
unfamiliar environment might affect such decisions.
Choices that interested investigators included "life-changing
decisions about debt in the environment of a financial
institution, under perceived time pressure, and making
decisions about job-offers in the context of welfare
94 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2015); see also FTC, COMPLYING WITH THE
FUNERAL RULE (2012), https ://www.ftc. gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/complying-funeral-rule.
95 Elizabeth Sweet et al., The High Price of Debt." Household
Financial Debt and itAs Impact on Mental and Physical Health, 91 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 94 (2013).
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centers."96 Investigators wondered whether stress "effects
are substantial enough to merit a change in core models of
economic decision-making and ultimately the design of
major policy institutions such as welfare mechanisms and
regulatory structures for financial marketing and
bankruptcy resolution."97
In a laboratory setting, subjects responded to two blocks
of financial decision tasks. After the first block, researchers
randomly divided subjects into three sets, including one
control group. The second group received a series of
increasingly difficult IQ test questions administered to
prompt cognitive stress. In the third group, each subject
experienced an ice-cold footbath, designed to increase blood
pressure and other sympathetic nervous system indicators.
Subjects then responded to the second block of financial
decision tasks. The researchers found:
[E]xposure to stress significantly increases the
degree of discounting displayed by individuals,
and leads to large reductions in the
respondents' willingness to learn about
investment options before making their final
decision. . . . [S]tress increases monthly
discounting rates by about one third, and
reduces the average effort made to learn about
risky decisions by about 20 percent. .
[S]tress [also] increases the degree of risk
aversion-the observed differences in risk
aversion were however not statistically
significant. 98
Lab research confirms that stress does influence decisions
and decision-making processes in ways that significantly
96 Liam Delaney et al., Effects of Stress on Economic Decision-
Making Evidence from Laboratory Experiments, THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE STUDY OF LABOR (IZA) DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 8060, Mar. 2014, at 2,
availablo at http://ftp.iza.org/dp8060.pdf.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 3.
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affect the perception and comparison of the utility of
options. Stable, well-developed preferences are among the
prerequisites of a voluntary, Pareto optimizing choice. Both
cognitive and physiological stressors contribute to the
decision task changes. 99
Other "evidence from lab-based experiments suggests
that mood and emotional state can strongly affect individual
[financial] decisions in the short run." 100 Liam Delaney and
his team noted that, "the relative weighting of short- versus
long-term benefits is critically affected by the physical and
mental state of respondents, and strongly influenced by
primary impulses such as hunger, thirst and sexual
arousal." 101 Scientists also indicated, "[r]ecent work . ..
suggests that poverty can impede cognitive function and the
quality of decisions-the results presented in this study
suggest that physical or cognitive stress could play an
important role in this relationship." 102 From the Delaney
study, researchers proposed, "[m]any real-world financial
decisions arguably involve stress at the point of decision
and our results clearly suggest that this may lead to fewer
exploratory and less future-oriented decisions with clearly
negative potential for individual and societal welfare." 103
Ironically, the very importance of certain decisions may
make them more cognitively challenging for the non-expert;
buffers and enhancers might improve outcomes in these
circumstances.
99 Id. at 13-14.
100 Id. at 4 (citing Andreas Knapp & Margaret S. Clark, Some
Detrimental Effects of Negative Mood on Individuals' Ability to Solve
Resource Dilemmas, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 678-88
(1991)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 15 (citing Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive
Function, 341 Sci. 976-80 (2013)).
10,3 Id.
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E. Effects of Consumer Apathy and Other Factors
Regarding Click Through Agreements
Another recent study focused on the CTAs discussed
above in this article. 1 0 4 In this study, researchers initially
examined why consumers routinely fail to read these
contracts. 105 They came to several conclusions about
consumer beliefs regarding CTAs. First, consumers believe
that "CTAs are too long and that reading them would take
too much time and effort." Second, people think that "CTAs
are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis such that
consumers have no choice but to accept their terms." Third,
nonreaders did not think that CTAs were relevant or
applied to them. Finally, "a significant number of
participants explained their lack of readership on the basis
of simple apathy, which may also reflect the belief that
CTAs are irrelevant." 1 0 6
Having determined many of the reasons why consumers
choose not to read CTAs, researchers next investigated if
they could address these beliefs and prompt response
changes. Specifically, they tested whether a modified CTA
might change the default decision not to read or cause
readers to spend longer at the task. By counteracting
participants' beliefs, researchers significantly increased
their subjects' willingness to read the agreements. Results
also indicated that, "participants spent significantly more
time reading the CTA . . . when it was presented in a
manner that suggested it was short and skimmable, that it
had different terms, that it was relevant, and that it could
be modified." 10 7
This CTA study was limited in that it examined the
consent offered by contracting undergraduates in an
"online" music website. However, when given the chance to
104 See supra Part II.C.
105 Victoria C. Plautt & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A
Social P ychological Investigation of Non -Readership of Clic k-Thro ugh
Agreements, 36 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 293-311 (2012).
106 Id. at 299.
107 Id. at 305 (emphasis in original).
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modify these CTAs, subjects read more of the contract and
"often used the modification option to purchase a more
desirable contract." 108 If experimenters can prompt college
students to read a CTA, one can imagine how law and
sociopolitical policy changes might cure or moderate apathy
and hopelessness in other contexts to change decision-
making behavior.
F Other Studies Involving Decision Making
Researchers have only begun to explore the variety of
factors that can influence "rational actor" decision making.
However, as noted, investigators have examined diverse
populations and a variety of contexts. In one study of
informed consent for clinical research, scientists found "that
empathy and emotion are related to subjects' decisional
capacity and informed consent. Higher cognitive empathic
abilities and good emotion recognition were related to
increased decisional capacity and higher refusal rates." 10 9
A number of studies focus on decision making by alcohol
dependents and recreational or addictive drug users. One
study of this set determined that alcohol-dependent
individuals made comparatively disadvantageous choices on
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)110 and risky choices on the
108 Id. at 306.
109 Alexander Supady et al., How is Informed Consent Related to
Emotions and Empathy? An Exploratory Neuroethical Investigation, 37
J. MED. ETHICS 311-317, 316 (2011).
110 Damien Brevers et al., Impaired Decision-Making Under Risk in
Individuals with Alcohol Dependence, 38 ALCOHOL CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 1924, 1924-1931 (2014). Researchers described the
IGT:
In the IGT, participants sat in front of 4 decks of
cards that were identical in appearance, except for their
labels A, B, C, and D. They were told that the game
involved a long series of pack selections and wagers and
that the goal was to earn as much money as possible.
Participants were informed that each trial would consist
of (i) a pack selection and (ii) the turning over of 1 card
from the selected pack to reveal the yield. Participants
were informed that they were free to switch between
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Cups and Coin Flipping Tasks.111 Scientists suggested that,
"alcohol-dependent individuals may be more prone to taking
high-risk choices because of their lowered capacity to
decks at any time, and as often as desired. The net
outcome of choosing from either decks A or B was a loss
of 5 times the average per 10 cards (referred to as
disadvantageous decks), and the net outcome of choosing
from either decks C or D was a gain of 5 times the
average per 10 cards (referred to as advantageous
decks). The total number of trials was set at 100 card
selections. The dependent measure for advantageous
choice was the number of cards picked from the
advantageous decks in each block of 20 cards.
Id. at 1926.
111 The authors described the Coin Flipping Task:
Participants decided whether to accept or reject
mixed gambles that offered a 50/50 chance of either
gaining a given amount of money or losing another
amount. To encourage participants to reflect on the
subjective attractiveness of each gamble rather than to
rely on a fixed decision rule, we asked them to indicate 1
of 4 responses to each gamble (strongly accept, weakly
accept, weakly reject, and strongly reject). The size of
the potential gain and loss was manipulated
independently, with gains ranging from C10 to C40 (in
increments of C2) and losses ranging from £5 to C20 (in
increments of 1), resulting in 256 random trials. The
dependent measure of the Coin Flipping Task was the
participant's gamble acceptance for 6 computed win/loss
ratio that include trials in which (i) potential gain equal
the potential loss, trials where potential gain was
maximum (ii) twice, (iii) twice point 5, (iv) thrice, (v) 4
times, or (vi) 8 times the amount of the potential loss.")
Id. In a lengthy discussion of the Cups Task, researchers
explained:
On each trial, an array of 2, 3, or 5 cups is shown on
1 side of the screen, with the possible gain or loss shown
on top. This array is identified as the risky side where
selection of 1 cup of the total number of cups will lead to
a designated number of euros gained (or lost), whereas a
selection of the other cups will lead to no gain (or no
loss). After participants made the choice, the gamble
was resolved immediately, allowing them to experience
the consequence of the risky or safe choice.
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manage the interference effects induced by immediate,
highly salient information in working memory." 112 Their
findings demonstrated that results on the IGT did not
recover over time after abstinence from alcohol
consumption. 113
Other similar decision-making studies include research
involving at-risk 114 and pathological 115 gamblers, heroin
dependents, 116 and recreational and dependent cocaine
users. 117 This research on the decision making of substance
users and dependents leads to questions about how diet,
exercise, and other activities might affect decision-making
processes. One study concerning an activity's influence on
decision making found that mindfulness meditation
112 Id. at 1929.
113 Id. at 1924.
114 Jon Edgar Grant et al., Selective Decision -Making Deficits in At-
Risk Gamblers, 189 PSYCHIATRY RES. 115-120 (2011) (suggesting that
selective cognitive dysfunction may be present for decision making by
at-risk gamblers, even before psychopathology arises).
115 Anja Kraplin et al., Dysfunctional Decision -Making in
Pathological Gambling Pattern Specificity and the Role of Impulsivity,
215 PSYCHIATRY RES. 675-682 (2014) ("PGs [pathological gamblers]
exhibited higher risk seeking and an immediate reward focus in the
CGT [Cambridge Gambling Task] and, in contrast, comparable strategic
planning to the control group .... Decision-making impairments were
related to more severe delay discounting and, specifically, to increased
urgency and less premeditation."); Wan-Sen Yan et al., Working
Memory and Affoctive Decision -Making in Addiction: A Neurocognitive
Comparison Between Heroin Addicts, Pathological Gamblers and
Healthy Controls, 134 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 194-200 (2014)
("Our findings indicate that deficits in affective decision-making shared
by heroin dependence and PG putatively represent vulnerabilities to
addiction and that working memory deficits detected only in heroin
addicts may be identified as heroin-specific harmful effects.").
116 Yan, supra note 115, at 194-200.
117 L. M. Hulka et al., Altered Social and Non-Social Decision-
Making in Recreational and Dependent Cocaine Users, 44 PSYCHOL.
MED. 1015-1028 (2014) (finding, in part, that decisions in the social
interaction tasks of both cocaine user groups were more self-serving
compared with controls given that cocaine users chose higher monetary
payoffs for themselves). Researchers observed that only dependent
cocaine users made riskier choices on the IGT. Id. at 1024.
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correlated with a reduction of the "sunk cost bias." 118 More
specifically, participants who regularly meditated were
better able to resist the impulse to continue an endeavor
once they had already invested (money, time, or effort) in
the task. 119
Another area of research involves examination of the
particular decision-making capacities of elders. One study
examined the diurnal cycle of cortisol that researchers
believe "to be an indicator of one of the main stress-response
systems, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis." 120
This area of research suggested that chronic stress may
accelerate cognitive decline in older adults.
G. The Person or the Situation.' Which Comes First in the
Corruption of Consent?
These studies highlight the question of whether context
or the actor may influence or corrupt consent. Margaret
Isabel Hall discusses the difference between incapacity and
impaired consent. She explains, "Distinguished from
incapacity, equity explains impaired consent with reference
to the situation or context, rather than the internally
generated and fixed state of the individual (the individualis
incapable; the situation is one of undue influence or the
transaction is unconscionable)."'121 She acknowledges that
individual characteristics, including "declining or
fluctuating mental processes of early dementia" are relevant
118 Andrew C. Hafenbrack et al., Dobiasing the Mind Through
Meditation, PSYCHOL. SCI. 1-8 (2013).
119 Id. at 6-7. Researchers defined mindfulness meditation as
consisting "of focusing on present experience and clearing one's mind of
other thoughts; this is often accomplished by focusing attention on the
physical sensations of breathing." Id. at 1.
120 Joshua A. Weller et al., Diurnal Cortisol Rhythm Is Associated
With Increased Risky Decision -Making in Older Adults, 29 PSYCHOL.
AND AGING 271, 272 (2014).
121 Margaret I. Hall, Capacity, Vulnerability, Risk, and Consent."
Personhood and the Law, in DECISION-MAKING, PERSONHOOD AND
DEMENTIA (Deborah O'Connor ed., 2009).
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to impaired consent but that "[n]one of these factors are, in
themselves, sufficient to establish incapacity." 122
We are agnostic on the point of establishing a legal
threshold of incapacity, especially as it pertains to future
decision-making autonomy. However, we make two related
points. First, certain situations can clearly influence
human mental and physiological responses that prompt
"consent." Second, the legal result of incapacity and
impaired consent are the same: voidability of consent (or a
contract). If jurists cannot know whether the stressful
situation or the individual's biochemical-psychological
response corrupts capacity does it really matter? Evidence
concerning individual incapacity and situational forces
demonstrates that "radical consent" should not remain the
default presumption.
V. ADDRESSING TH MYTH OF CONSENT WITH TRADITIONAL
AND NEUROJURIDICAL ToOLs
We have argued so far that the model of "radical
consent," which prominent legal economists use for
establishing rights and obligations under private law, is
poorly matched to the task of creating just and optimal
results in many cases. We have also advocated for legal
rules that create more nuanced frameworks for transactions
and other consent-driven interactions. We have explored
the contributions that cognitive neuroscience and related
areas of psychology can make to help us understand the
kinds of problems humans face when giving legally binding
consent. Here we turn to the kinds of traditional and
innovative neurojuridical tools that implement more
nuanced strategies in the law. For the young, we can seek
training grounds for Pareto style optimization. For the
elderly, we can design increasing levels of protection that do
not depend upon the "on-off switch" of traditional
determinations of "capacity." And for the rest of us, we can
fashion domain-specific protections that provide "Pareto
prostheses" to aid contextually challenged actors in making
122 Id.
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good choices in a potentially predatory world. 123 Happily,
we are not starting from scratch; jurists have already
created and incorporated a significant number of such legal
protections.
A. Historical Legal Approaches to the Myth of Consent
For hundreds of years, the law has recognized that some
persons who benefit from autonomous action may not have
the capacity to make sound legal decisions consistently.
The law has historically accounted for the myth of legal
consent by these persons. It has recognized that their
capacity could be developing or compromised. One can find
legal catalysts that have operated for hundreds of years to
address vulnerable actors.
1. Historical Approaches To Cognitive Incapacity
Two Restatements of law have long distinguished legal
capacity and consent by minors and others. For example,
these restatements implement legal catalysts to facilitate
"consent" by minors, while at the same time protecting
them from their bad or compromised decisions. According
to the Second Restatement of Contracts, section 12 (2), "A
natural person who manifests assent to a transaction has
full legal capacity to incur contractual duties thereby ...
.,124 This section expresses the legal default. However, it
also lists four exceptions, including infants 125 and the
mentally ill or defective, 126 who lack the capacity to
consent. 127
123 See generally Oliver R. Goodenough, Governance for Cloud
Computing.' The Role of Public and Private Rulemaking in Promoting
the Growth of a New Industry, (Vermont Law School Research Paper
No. 34-13, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342594 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2342594.
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2) (1981).
125 Id. § 12(2)(b) (1981).
126 Id. § 12(2)(c) (1981).
127 See id. § 12(2)(b) (1981).
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Minors and those lacking capacity can still make
contracts but they are voidable by the minor or the one
with the disability. 128 We allow minors and other
vulnerable persons to void their contracts because we fear
that unscrupulous adults will take legal advantage of
children 129 and the disabled. 130 The rescission right
operates as a legal catalyst. It protects minors and the
disabled from poor contract choices since these persons (or
their guardians) can extract themselves from
disadvantageous deals. It also serves as notice to their
adult contract partners that they do business with minors
or the disabled at their risk. The law does not, however,
ban contracting between adults and such vulnerable
persons. Minors, elders, and the disabled enjoy the
freedom to exercise their autonomous choices and bargain
while still protected by the safety net of rescission.
The Second Restatement of Torts, section 892A,
similarly addresses capacity and consent. 131 Subsection
(2)(a) provides that in order to extinguish tort liability, for
example, consent must be "by one who has the capacity to
consent." A comment to this subsection provides:
128 See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 6710 (West 2014) (allowing minors
to disaffirm contracts during their minority or within a reasonable time
afterwards); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo. 1981); JEFF
FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 603-04 (2d ed. 2010); soo also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
129 "It is the policy of the law to protect infants against their own
mistakes or improvidence, and from designs of others, and to discourage
adults from contracting with an infant." Ex parto Odem, 537 So. 2d
919, 920 (Ala. 1988) (quoting 43 C.J.S. Infants § 180 (1978)). Some
states require that a minor return consideration or benefits received.
Soo, o.g., Mullen v. Tucker, 510 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
that return of consideration was required to void the contract but that
failure to do so was not a condition precedent to power to avoid).
130 Knowlton v. Mudd, 775 P.2d 154, 156 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)
(allowing conservator of a woman who suffered from Parkinson's disease
to void a contract amendment because the woman lacked sufficient
mental capacity to understand the amendment).
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(a) (1979).
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If, however, the one who consents is not
capable of appreciating the nature, extent or
probable consequences of the conduct, the
consent is not effective to bar liability unless
the parent, guardian, or other person
empowered to consent for the incompetent has
given consent, in which case the consent of the
authorized person will be effective even though
the incompetent does not consent .... 132
This explanatory comment contemplates that children,
for example, may not have capacity. It also stresses the
cognitive aspects of capacity. The law provides that parents
or other empowered persons can consent for the one lacking
competence. How one judges whether the minor is capable
remains unexplored and highlights the problematic nature
of consent by minors in tort law.
What this brief consideration of consent by minors and
the disabled makes clear is that the law functions to allow
autonomous choice by vulnerable persons. Arguably, these
persons who lack capacity are not truly consenting, hence
the myth of legal consent. We permit them to void their
consent, however, to minimize the negative consequences of
consent that disadvantages them.
We can now see how historical approaches to the myth of
consent might assist vulnerable actors introduced above. If
we permitted Jane Doe to withdraw her consent to sex,
rescind her agreement, she might still sue for sexual
harassment or other tort injuries. Horton should have been
on notice that any agreement struck with Doe was voidable
by Doe. Starbucks would have made clear to its agents and
supervisory employees that it would not tolerate
"consensual" sexual liaisons at work. While the use of the
Restatement might not protect Doe in the first instance, it
does offer her some relief for her mistaken bargain.
Similarly, Mrs. Belinky can consent to overnights by her
husband. However, he proceeds with the understanding
1;32 Id. § 892A cmt. b (emphasis added).
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that she can rescind her consent. What protects the Drake
Center? It can request indemnification by Mr. Belinky.
2. Historical Approaches to Volitional Incapacity
Some of the parties introduced above suffered not from
cognitive impairment but from trouble making choices
because of situational stress or a temporary inability to
control their behavior. The Second Restatement of
Contracts distinguishes between cognitive and volitional
incapacity in the context of mental disabilities. Section
15(1) provides:
A person incurs only voidable contractual
duties by entering into a transaction if by
reason of mental illness or defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable
manner the nature and consequences of the
transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner
in relation to the transaction and the other
party has reason to know of his condition. 133
Mirroring the tort guidance of section 892A, subsection
(a) focuses on cognitive capacity. Subsection (b) concerns
volitional incapacity, the inability to regulate one's
responses in a social context. This second subsection
anticipates that, even though some actors may understand
the nature of a transaction or conduct, these incapacitated
individuals may not be able to control their responsive
behavior reasonably.
Comment b. to section 15 notes that various types of
mental incompetency exist in varying degrees. It lists
several disabilities including "congenital deficiencies in
intelligence, the mental deterioration of old age, the effects
of brain damage caused by accident or organic disease, and
mental illnesses evidenced by such symptoms as delusions,
1'3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1) (1981).
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hallucinations, delirium, confusion and depression." 134 In
further illustrating volitional incapacity, the comment
explains:
Even though understanding is complete, [an
incapacitated man] may lack the ability to
control his acts in the way that [a] normal
individual can and does control them; in such
cases the inability makes the contract voidable
only if the other party has reason to know of
his condition. Where a person has some
understanding of a particular transaction
which is affected by mental illness or defect,
the controlling consideration is whether the
transaction in its result is one which a
reasonably competent person might have
made. 135
This passage contemplates that when a transaction partner
has reason to know of volitional incapacity, the contract will
be voidable.
Again, a legal tool, rescission, protects individuals who
suffer from volitional incapacity. If the partner has reason
to know of the disabled condition, he is on notice that he
proceeds with the action at his risk. Most actors know
when they are dealing with elders or disabled individuals.
Many can ascertain this information by requesting age
specifying identification or by the nature of the
circumstances. Mr. Belinky knew that his wife was
disabled and was willing to take the risk of accusation just
to comfort her.
This comment also prompts the question whether some
mature and otherwise fully functional adults may suffer
from a similar volitional incapacity or "defect." What about
a mourner at a funeral home, a residential consumer buying
a vacuum cleaner from a door-to-door salesman, or a
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (emphasis
added).
1,35 Id. (emphasis added).
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mortgagee who is about to sign loan documents? As
discussed below, the law already anticipates all of these
cases.
This very brief review of capacity and consent highlights
that the law (of at least two Restatements) anticipates
many circumstances in which actors may have developing,
diminished, or declining capacity. However, with every
mature adult, we assume full legal capacity by default.
Neuroscientific discoveries relating to developing capacity,
declining mental function, sundowning, and situational
stress suggest that even rational actors may have trouble
accessing knowledge, controlling impulses, and making the
synaptic connections that result in optimal bargained-for
outcomes. In part, imperfect actors and conditions corrupt
consent.
The neuroscience and psychosocial evidence not only
bolster historical attempts to deal with human frailties,
they also highlight the need for more comprehensive legal
responses. The necessary steps to reform are as much
conceptual as creative: we need to move from viewing these
approaches as exceptions to viewing them as readily
available elements in the law's bag of tools. In section B.,
we proceed with a summary review of a number of the
existing tools, not so much to create an exhaustive catalog
but to flesh out our argument and prompt further
discussion. In section C., we suggest a possible re-framing
of consent that may form the basis for a more fundamental
change in approach, particularly in the context of a learning
period such as adolescence.
B. Traditional Tools
The existing tools can, for the most part, be grouped into
two large categories: (1) consent "enhancers" and (2) consent
"frames" or "buffers." The enhancers generally aim to
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Many professionals strive to inform the more ignorant.
Disclosure rules operate in many contexts, from cigarette
sales 136 and drug and medical therapies 137 to offerings of
investment securities. 138 Many people question the efficacy
of disclosure, at least as it frequently plays out in real world
practice. Dense legalese, repelling typeface, and other
barriers thwart actual engagement and understanding.
These hindrances underscore the potential payoffs for
transaction players who can induce evaluation failure in
their contracting counterparts. 139
Education about the meaning of information is a related
goal. An information processing imbalance can be as
damaging for a party as an information access imbalance.
Enhanced training of players to better evaluate available
information might ameliorate processing imbalances. Given
the possibility for self-protection that educated consumers
can muster for themselves, the American educational
system's failure to emphasize financial literacy and related
skills is surprising. In a sense, the best way to educate is to
create a safe space in which to experiment with decision
making for a particular task. We seek to foster this
136 21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.10(a), 1141.12 (2015); see also Overview."
Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7HA-
XKGB. See generally Andrew C. Budzinski, A Disclosure-Focused
Approach to Compelled Commercial Speech, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1305
(2014).
137 E.g., David G. Adams, FDA Regulation of Communications on
Pharmace utical Products, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1399 (1994).
138 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77g (2014)
139 OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU
WANTED TO KNow: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014);
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Yannis Bakos et al., Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form
Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will
Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the
ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts," 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
165 (2011); Are 'Pay Now, Terms Later' Contracts Worse for Buyers?
Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309
(2009); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of
Standard Form Contracts' The Case of Software License Agreements, 5
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2008).
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approach in suggesting legal assent, described below. As
discussed above, neuroscience studies indicate that simple
access to information is no replacement for experience that
exercises the cognitive neurobiological tools for effective
decision making. "Once burned, twice shy" says the
proverb, not "once warned, twice shy." Experience builds
judgment in a way that neutral information cannot.
The provision for or even mandated expert advice is
another technique that can help bridge this information
gap. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Regulation D adopts this approach in the Rule 506
requirement for the participation of a purchaser
representative for unsophisticated, non-accredited
investors.14 0 These enhancement techniques and others are
intended to move otherwise disadvantaged participants
closer to the cognitive and informational ideal on which the
benefits of consent are premised.
As with many well-intentioned measures, such "fixes"
can sometimes have unintended consequences that can
make them counterproductive. The cigarette industry, for
instance, has been able to successfully assert that the
highly visible warnings about the dangers of smoking make
the "choice" of smoking a matter of autonomy by the
smoker, fending off potential liability for the manufacturer
that sells an inherently damaging product. 141
2. Consent Buffers and Frames
The second major set of responses uses embedded
"frames" and "buffers" in the law of obligation and consent
itself. One approach involves creating un-waivable (or at
least hard to waive) duties on the other party to avoid
taking advantage in a context of consent. Fiduciary duties
are a classic example of this. A trustee is obligated not to
engage in predatory practices with the beneficiary of the
140 17 CFR § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014).
141 Jack E. Henningfield et al., Tobacco Industry Litigation Position
on Addiction." Continued Dependence on Past Views, 15 TOBACCO
CONTROL iv27 (2006), archived athttp://perma.cc/K8KT-9R9E.
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trust, or with its corpus. The consent by the beneficiary to
any "self-dealing" transaction is hedged around with hard-
to-satisfy requirements for disclosure and for objective
fairness. 142 The law of corporations adopts similar
requirements for directors and officers. Under classic law, a
self-dealing transaction was presumptively void. Even
under "reformed" practice it remains voidable unless
specified standards of disclosure, deliberation, and
substantive fairness are met. 143 In contract and property
law, implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for
habitation, and marketable title create duties that buffer
against bad decision making and predatory activity. 144
Other tools for providing contextual granularity to
problems of capacity and consent involve rebuttable
presumptions, that both protect and provide some
flexibility, suitability standards, such as those embodied in
SEC Regulation D for Accredited Investors, 145 and waiting
periods and rescission rights, as in real estate mortgages in
many states. 146 Fraud laws provide a general protection
against active misrepresentation as a predatory practice.
The FTC is a particularly prolific source of traditional
"exception" style rules. Their regulations create consumer
protections in contexts of stress, imbalance of experience,
and coercive pressure of the kind we have identified as good
candidates for a Pareto prosthesis. For example, FTC
regulations address cooling off periods for sales made in
homes or at other specific locations. 147 Similarly, another
142 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539
(1949); Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the
Exoneration Clause." Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions
Involving Trust Property, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 43 (1998).
143 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8 §144(a)(1)-(3) (2014).
144 Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984); Lohmeyer v. Bower,
227 P.2d 102 (Kan. 1951); U.C.C., §§ 2-315, 2-316 (2013); HOGG, supra
note 47; Wallace Sedgwick et al., Products Liability. Implied
Warranties, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 139 (1964).
145 17 CFR § 230.501(a) (2014).
146 12 CFR § 226.19 (2014).
147 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2014).
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FTC regulation addresses deceptive credit practices. 148
Another FTC provision deals with funeral home practices
and requires disclosures for specific services and prior
approval for certain procedures. 149 Other sections deal with
deceptive advertising and labeling of cigarettes, 150 used car
sales, 151 telephone and mail order sales, 152 and home
insulation. 153 Home insulation is a classic example of an
unusual transaction where the consumer has little
experience and where the end result will be hard for the
consumer to evaluate. 154
These regulations clearly anticipate the distorting effects
of physiological disabilities (nicotine addiction), stressful
sales conditions, and other compromising circumstances.
They also foresee the possibility of predation by savvy
operators who attempt to exploit grieving, stressed, or
otherwise compromised individuals. While we applaud
most of these rules, we view them as still being part of a
pattern of piecemeal response to context-specific concerns.
We think it is time for society and its jurists to modify legal
defaults more generally to account for the realities of
human decision making. And in doing so, they should take
advantage of the contributions that neuroscience can make
to policy determination and implementation. The following
discussion explores how we might develop a cognitively
informed set of tools, moving through and beyond
traditional approaches to the myth of consent.
C A New Neurojuridical Tool-Legal Assent
The law has historically addressed both cognitive and
volitional incapacity through rescission. It has also dealt
148 16 C.F.R. § 444 (2014).
149 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2014).
150 16 C.F.R. § 408 (2014).
151 16 C.F.R. § 455 (2014).
152 16 C.F.R. § 435 (2014).
153 16 C.F.R. § 460 (2014).
154 For a general treatment of FTC rules in consumer protection
areas, see Selected Industries, FTC, archived at http://perma.cc/5Z45-
XB6Y.
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with bargaining imbalances through traditional consent
enhancers and buffers. One can envision other catalytic
tools, however, to promote efficient bargains and protect
vulnerable actors. For example, legal assent offers a new
mechanism to advance a bargain through to commitment
while still protecting the assenting party. It contests the
default approach that assumes highly sophisticated and
competently cool, rational actors. Legal assent carries no
presumption of capacity. Society credits assent with legal
relevance because it wants to afford frail, immature, and
mentally or emotionally disabled persons the independence,
autonomy, and opportunity to practice good decision
making. Legal assent operates as a "temporary permit" for
legal authority.
Legal assent might work for many classes of
compromised persons: adolescents, frail elders, grieving
persons, and the mentally challenged. As opposed to
medical assent, legal assent when offered by an adolescent,
for example, does not require associated parental
permission or consent. Similar to consent by a minor under
contract law, assent is voidable by the minor.
Assent operates slightly differently from traditional,
voidable contract consent by a minor, however. As noted,
assent presumes no legal capacity. Moreover, the minor or
assenting party may void assent only with good reason.
Adult abuse, adult exploitation of an unfair advantage, and
breach of a duty owed to the minor or to another assenting
person, all justify revocation. Additionally, parents cannot
void a minor's assent. Although parents may offer their
wise guidance, undue influence by a parent or other adult
nullifies revocation. If a court determines that the original
decision was, borrowing from family law, in the minor's or
the assenting party's best interests, it can reject the
revocation.155 On the other hand, if a minor or assenting
party successfully voids her assent, a court cannot admit it
into evidence or permit discovery on the matter. A criminal
155 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (explaining the
"presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her
child") (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
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prosecutor might still prosecute an adult who has sex with
an assenting minor, however, because the assent operates
solely to benefit the minor or the assenting party.
One can see how assent might change the outcome of
several cases discussed above. Jane Doe could revoke her
assent to sex with her Starbucks manager. Presumably, sex
with the manager was not in her best interest. An elderly
person who assents to pay for a new roof offered by an
unscrupulous door-to-door salesperson may revoke his
assent. A grieving person might revoke assent offered for
funeral services not needed, beyond the financial
wherewithal of the assenter, and extracted in suspicious
circumstances.
The world of commerce will not come to a screeching halt
with the implementation of legal assent. Honest adults will
not have sex with minors or try to sell unneeded services to
the elderly and grieving family members. Judges will not
permit the abrogation of decisions wisely made in the first
instance. The voidability of corporate action in the presence
of director self-interest noted above provides a point of
comparison for this approach. Legal assent operates to
allow the assenting party only to correct an error made in
the moment of immature, disoriented, or stressed decision
making by a compromised individual. It plays a role in a
controversy only when the bargaining party with the
superior position contests the withdrawal of assent. It
evens the playing field.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
"Mistakes are the usual bridge between inexperience
and wisdom."
Phyllis Theroux, NightLights
The neoclassical model of radical consent has value for
many everyday purchases as well as for sophisticated
transactions by savvy, knowledgeable traders and market
professionals. However, radical legal consent disadvantages
many more common individuals, particularly in unfamiliar
or stressful circumstances, and should not serve as the
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default legal presumption for most transactional
encounters.
We all make mistakes. As responsible adult actors, we
must suffer the consequences of many of them. However,
the law can and already does anticipate when legally
binding consent is tainted by immaturity, dementia, or
some other biophysical, mental, or emotional disability.
This article demonstrates that neuroscience and
psychosocial studies provide the supportive evidence for
dismantling the radical default of un-buffered legal consent.
It begins the conversation about how a reconceptualization
of legal consent might benefit from the use of newvjuridical
tools. Enhancers, frames, and new mechanisms, such as
legal assent, work to even playing fields and optimize
mutually beneficial transactions. Pareto prostheses have
existed for hundreds of years in law. We should give them
full recognition for the valuable service they do for so many
individuals. As youth develop wisdom, as elders and others
adjust to their changing capacities, the law can facilitate
autonomous or semi-independent participation in commerce
and legal transactions.
Legal capacity is not an on-off switch. It is time to
recognize that reality and find new ways to illuminate the
field lights for more Pareto-seeking legal players.
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